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The prohibition applies even if the dancer is at least partially clothed. If Elvis' gyrating hips can fairly be understood to constitute a "simulated sex act," one can fully appreciate the potential scope of the restrictions placed on erotic dancers in Maricopa County.
The problem lies in the circularity of the ordinance's logic: Section 13 e forbids certain expressive activity — simulated sex acts — only within adult-oriented businesses but not elsewhere.
But the ordinance defines adult-oriented businesses as those that feature performances "characterized by the exposure of specific anatomical areas or specified sexual activities.
To wit, Dream Palace is an adult entertainment business because it features nude and semi-nude dancers engaging in "specific sexual activity," and as a result, it is prohibited from featuring nude or semi-nude "specific sexual activity.
This is a total ban on nude and semi-nude dancing in everything but name, and indeed the county concedes as much, arguing that it is empowered to effect such a ban on the specific movements a dancer may, or more precisely may not, make, pursuant to its general police power.
It relies on California v. LaRue , U. Rhode Island , U. In LaRue , the Supreme Court upheld a facial challenge to California regulations enacted in response to live sex shows and sexual contact between nude performers and patrons in establishments licensed to sell liquor.
The record in that case was "a sordid one," and consisted of testimony regarding customers engaging in oral copulation with dancers, public masturbation, and numerous other contacts between male customers and female performers.
The Court concluded that the regulation was permissible because of the "critical fact It has merely proscribed such performances in establishments it licenses to sell liquor by the drink.
The Court stated that the Twenty-First Amendment required an "added presumption in favor of the validity of state regulation in this area. The Court later disowned its reliance on the Twenty-first Amendment in 44 Liquormart , U.
LaRue and 44 Liquormart do not support the county's proposition. LaRue rested squarely on the "critical fact" that California had not enacted an "across the board" ban, but rather prohibited such performances in establishments it licenses to sell alcohol.
That is not the case here; the Maricopa County ban on "specified sexual activities" is sweeping in its scope, and is not limited to establishments holding a liquor license.
More important, the record before the legislature in LaRue spoke more to a "gross sexuality than of communication," U.
The ordinance, however, strictly prohibits any contact between patrons and performers. Further, the stage on which performances take place must be elevated, patrons must stay at least three feet away from performers, and are separated from them by a barrier or a railing, over which neither a patron nor a performer may extend "any part of his or her body.
All performances must take place within a manager's sight line, id. The county has taken reasonable steps to guard against the kind of "gross sexual conduct" or "bacchanalian revelries" that were the target of the regulation in LaRue.
After the ordinance takes those steps, however, it goes further, and restricts the particular movements and gestures a dancer may or may not make during the course of a performance.
The Court's citations to Young and Barnes immediately after the passage on which the county relies, both cases that apply First Amendment scrutiny to ordinances regulating adult entertainment businesses, make this amply clear.
Whatever the scope of the county's asserted police power, it "must be exercised within constitutional limits. East Cleveland , U.
The county's fallback argument is that section 13 e is valid under Renton. While the county is on firmer ground here, we remain unconvinced of the soundness of its position.
Renton and its progeny do not give carte blanche to the government to proscribe absolutely certain types of adult entertainment.
Rather, Renton effects a common-sense balance between the government's undoubted interest in curbing the effects such businesses have on surrounding communities on the one hand, and the enjoyment of, and practice in, protected expression on the other.
Its rationale is that content-discriminatory time, place, and manner regulations receive intermediate scrutiny only when the government avoids a total ban on protected expression, and when its predominant interest, supported by an evidentiary record, is in the amelioration of secondary effects.
The county's bid for intermediate scrutiny fails to clear the first hurdle, because section 13 e effects a total ban on a particular kind of erotic expression at all times and in every part of the county.
The argument that section 13 e is really just a plain old time, place and manner restriction because it prohibits only certain expressive activity in certain types of establishments but not elsewhere does not work because, for reasons explained earlier, the only way an establishment fits within the ordinance in the first place is if it engages in that which the ordinance prohibits.
The prohibition Maricopa County has put in place is quite different from any of the regulations the Supreme Court has considered in the Renton line.
The Renton ordinance itself was a classic content-discriminatory time, place, and manner regulation.
While it targeted adult entertainment on the basis of its content, the ordinance did "not ban adult theaters altogether. Instead, it imposed restrictions on where such establishments could operate in order to protect residential neighborhoods.
Consequently, it was subject to intermediate instead of strict scrutiny. The same is true of the Young ordinance, which imposed geographic zoning restrictions on adult entertainment.
So long as an establishment complied with the regulation, it was free to provide adult entertainment "essentially unrestrained.
The Court specifically noted in that case that " [t]he situation would be quite different if the ordinance had the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting access to, lawful speech.
Borough of Mount Ephraim , U. Other cases in the Renton line have drawn intermediate scrutiny because, even though they incidentally burdened expression, they were facially content-neutral laws of general applicability.
In Barnes , the Court dealt with a state statute prohibiting nudity in public places "across the board" in a facially content-neutral manner.
The statute on its face was "not at all inherently related to expression," id. The city ordinance in Erie was also a content-neutral proscription of public nudity.
By its terms, the ordinance regulates conduct alone. It does not target nudity that contains an erotic message; rather, it bans all public nudity, regardless of whether that nudity is accompanied by expressive activity.
The prohibition at issue in this case is of a different order. It is not a content-discriminatory time, place and manner regulation, so it is not like the ordinances at issue in Renton and Young.
Nor is it a facially-neutral law of general applicability, so it is not like the ordinances in Barnes and Erie. Section 13 e "does not The Seventh Circuit considered the same prohibition on "specific sexual activity" in Schultz , F.
By restricting the particular movements and gestures of the erotic dancer The dominant theme of nude dance is an emotional one; it is one of eroticism and sensuality.
It interdicts the two key tools of expression in this context that imbue erotic dance with its sexual and erotic character — sexually explicit dance movements and nudity The Seventh Circuit further explained that the government could not hide behind Renton because "a secondary-effects rationale by itself does not bestow upon the government free license to suppress specific content of a specific message We are inclined to agree with the Seventh Circuit.
Maricopa County cannot avoid the constitutional prohibition on proscribing non-obscene speech "by regulating nude dancing with such stringent restrictions that the dance no longer conveys eroticism nor resembles adult entertainment.
Section 13 e , in preventing erotic dancers from practicing a protected form of expression, does precisely that.
We therefore apply strict scrutiny to section 13 e. To survive strict scrutiny, the provision must be tailored to "serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.
New York Crime Victims Bd. Section 13 e is not necessary to serve Maricopa County's unquestioned significant interest in ameliorating secondary effects.
The county can, and does, utilize a variety of less restrictive and more direct means to fight those effects.
Nor has the county explained how the restriction will in fact further its interest in curbing secondary effects. Therefore, we must conclude that section 13 e is an unconstitutional burden on the enjoyment of protected expression.
Our decision today does not necessarily imply that none of the activities listed in section 13 e may be proscribed, consistent with the Constitution, through a well-crafted ordinance.
Brownell , F. Section 13 e is far too broad, however, and restricts in sweeping terms the ability of erotic dancers to convey their intended erotic message.
In defining establishments by reference to that which it prohibits, it amounts to an absolute ban on such activity in Maricopa County.
For these reasons, section 13 e is unconstitutional. In addition to the various First Amendment challenges to Ordinance P, Dream Palace sought invalidation of certain of its provisions on state law grounds.
Specifically, Dream Palace sought summary judgment with respect to certain operating restrictions on the basis that state law has preempted county law; it also sought invalidation of certain penalty provisions as ultra vires.
The district court declined to reach these issues, and dismissed the claims, explaining that "the remaining state-law claims raise delicate issues involving the interpretation and application of Arizona law and the balance of powers within Arizona between state and local government.
See Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys. While the district court had the discretion to reach and to decide these state law issues, we cannot say that its refusal to do so constituted an abuse of discretion.
See 28 U. Finally, because we have declared Ordinance P constitutionally invalid for some purposes but not for others, we must determine whether the valid portions can be severed from the invalid ones.
Fund I v. Town of Surprise , Ariz. Under Arizona law, the test for severability requires ascertaining legislative intent. Prentiss , Ariz. The Arizona Supreme Court has held that where "the valid parts of a statute are effective and enforceable standing alone and independent of those portions declared unconstitutional," a court should not disturb the valid part "if the valid and invalid portions are not so intimately connected as to raise the presumption the legislature would not have enacted one without the other, and the invalid portion was not the inducement of the act.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y , Ariz. Ordinance P contains a robust severability clause: "Each section and each provision or requirement of any section of this ordinance shall be deemed severable and the invalidity of any portion of this ordinance shall not affect the validity or enforceability of any other portion.
Given that the county board has clearly expressed its intent with respect to severability, we think the invalid portions of the ordinance are easily severable.
We hold unconstitutional the prohibition on specified sexual activity, and have instructed the district court to enjoin the disclosure to the public of information provided by permit applicants.
The vast majority of the provisions in the ordinance, including the licensing scheme, and multiple operating restrictions, withstand scrutiny.
The invalid portions are, therefore, severable from the remainder, and the remaining valid portions may remain in force.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED with instructions. Each party shall bear its own costs. I concur in Judge O'Scannlain's well-written opinion.
Were I writing on a blank slate, however, I would dissent from Section VI, which upholds the prohibition against operation of adult-oriented businesses between the hours of a.
As Judge O'Scannlain's opinion recognizes, the result reached in Section VI is largely controlled by Fair Public Policy v. I dissented in that case because I was convinced, as I still am, that the hours restriction violated the holding of a majority of the Supreme Court per Justice Kennedy in City of Los Angeles v.
Alameda Books, Inc. The record in the present case is not sufficiently different from that in Fair Public Policy to lead me to a different conclusion.
I recognize, however, that my view did not prevail in Fair Public Policy , and I am bound by that decision. I therefore concur fully in Judge O'Scannlain's opinion today.
MARICOPA COUNTY ORDINANCE NO. Based on public testimony and other evidence before it, including information, studies and court decisions from other jurisdictions, and in accordance with A.
The Board of Supervisors recognizes that some activities which occur in connection with adult oriented businesses are protected as expression under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The Board of Supervisors further recognizes that First Amendment rights are among our most precious and highly protected rights, and wishes to act consistently with full protection of those rights.
The Board is aware, however, that adult oriented businesses may and do generate secondary effects which are detrimental to the public health, safety and welfare.
Among those secondary effects are a prostitution and other sex related offenses b drug use and dealing c health risks through the spread of AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases and d infiltration by organized crime for the purpose of drug and sex related business activities, laundering of money and other illicit conduct.
This ordinance is not intended to interfere with legitimate expression but to avoid and mitigate the secondary effects enumerated above.
Specifically, the Board of Supervisors finds the licensing of persons who operate and manage adult oriented businesses and persons who provide adult services will further the goals of the ordinance by enabling the County to ascertain if an applicant is underage or has engaged in criminal or other behavior of the sort the ordinance is designed to limit.
This information will enable the County to allocate law enforcement resources effectively and otherwise protect the community. The Board of Supervisors finds that limiting proximity and contact between adult service providers and patrons promotes the goal of reducing prostitution and other casual sexual conduct and the attendant risk of sexually transmitted diseases.
The Board of Supervisors finds the foregoing to be true with respect to places where alcohol is served and where it is not.
The Board of Supervisors finds that individual and interactive sexual activities in adult video facilities pose a risk of sexually transmitted disease, especially AIDS, and that the booth configuration options of the ordinance will reduce that risk.
The Board of Supervisors finds that the harmful secondary effects of adult oriented businesses are more pronounced when conducted continuously or during late night hours.
The fees established for licenses and permits in this ordinance are based on the estimated cost of implementation, administration and enforcement of the licensing program.
The following words, terms and phrases when used in this ordinance shall have the meanings ascribed to them in this section, except where the context clearly indicates a different meaning:.
Adult Arcade means any place to which the public is permitted or invited and in which coin-operated or slug-operated or electronically, electrically or mechanically controlled still or motion picture machines, projectors or other image-producing devices are maintained to show images involving specific sexual activities or specific anatomical areas to persons in booths or viewing rooms.
Adult Bookstore or Adult Video Store means a commercial establishment that offers for sale or rent any of the following as one of its principal business purposes:.
Adult Live Entertainment Establishment means an establishment that features either:. Adult Motion Picture Theater means a commercial establishment in which for any form of consideration films, motion pictures, video cassettes, slides or other similar photographic reproductions that are characterized by the depiction or description of specific sexual activities or specific anatomical areas are predominantly shown.
Adult oriented business means adult arcades, adult bookstores or adult video stores, cabarets, adult live entertainment establishments, adult motion picture theaters, adult theaters, massage establishments that offer adult service or nude model studios.
Adult oriented business manager or "manager" means a person on the premises of an adult oriented business who is authorized to exercise overall operational control of the business.
Adult service means dancing, serving food or beverages, modeling, posing, wrestling, singing, reading, talking, listening or other performances or activities conducted for any consideration in an adult oriented business by a person who is nude or seminude during all or part of the time that the person is providing the service.
Adult service business means a business establishment or premises where any adult service is provided to patrons in the regular course of business. Adult service provider or "provider" means any person who provides an adult service.
Adult theater means a theater, concert hall, auditorium or similar commercial establishment that predominantly features persons who appear in a state of nudity or who engage in live performances that are characterized by the exposure of specific anatomical areas or specific sexual activities.
Booth means a partitioned area, in which coin or token operated video machines, projectors or other electronically or mechanically controlled devices are used in the regular course of business to produce still or moving picture images characterized by depiction of specific sexual activities or specific anatomical areas.
Cabaret means an adult oriented business licensed to provide alcoholic beverages pursuant to A. Title 4, Chapter 2, Article 1.
Director means the director of Maricopa County Planning and Development Department or the Director's designee.
Employee means any person hired, engaged or authorized to perform any service on the premises of an adult service business, including an adult service provider, whether denominated as an employee, independent contractor or otherwise.
Enterprise means a corporation, association, labor union or other legal entity, as provided in A. Search query.
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SEE REVIEWS. SEE OUR STORY. Spectacular Sunsets. Beautiful Courtyard. Janes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Patrin, F. This rule serves to ensure that legal arguments are considered with the benefit of a fully developed factual record, offers appellate courts the benefit of the district court's prior analysis, and prevents parties from sandbagging their opponents with new arguments on appeal.
We have, however, laid out several narrow exceptions to the rule — among them, the case in which "the issue is purely one of law, does not affect or rely upon the factual record developed by the parties, and will not prejudice the party against whom it is raised.
That exception applies here. Dream Palace's new arguments are based entirely in law and do not rely on the factual record.
Maricopa County will not be prejudiced by Dream Palace's failure to advance the arguments below; it has had, and has taken advantage of, a full opportunity to brief its response to the new arguments.
Even when a case falls into one of the exceptions to the rule against considering new arguments on appeal, we must still decide whether the particular circumstances of the case overcome our presumption against hearing new arguments.
In this case, a decision of this Court bearing directly on the issue of judicial review of adult-business licensing decisions — Baby Tam I — was displaced by a Supreme Court decision after the proceedings in the district court were complete.
Thus, Dream Palace made its decision to rely below on Baby Tam I within a very different legal landscape from the one that now obtains. For that reason, we exercise our discretion to consider the new arguments advanced by Dream Palace.
Thus, it contends, there is no guarantee that a court will hear the merits of a denied license applicant's claim. We must therefore determine whether Arizona law so provides.
Ordinance P provides that a final denial of a license application may be appealed to the Superior Court the state trial court "by special action or other available procedure.
See S. Thus, if there is any procedural route by which an applicant may obtain full review on the merits, we must reject Dream Palace's argument.
The parties vigorously dispute whether the "special action" proceeding is constitutionally sufficient.
The special action is a proceeding under Arizona law, created by rule in , that takes the place of the old common law writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition.
A special action may be instituted in Superior Court or in the appellate courts, see Ariz. When a plaintiff seeks special action review in the Superior Court, "the judge must first exercise his discretion and decide whether to consider the case on its merits.
Thorneycroft, Ariz. Were this discretion unbounded, the special action would, of course, provide no guarantee of judicial review on the merits.
If, on the other hand, the judge's "discretion" does not include the ability to dismiss a petition where it is the only route by which the petitioner can bring a constitutional challenge, then the mere use of the term "discretion" will not prevent the review from being constitutionally sufficient.
Arizona law in this area is not entirely pellucid. The Arizona Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he decision to accept jurisdiction of a special action petition is highly discretionary with the court in which the petition is filed.
This statement seems, on its face, to suggest that a court could dismiss a petition for reasons unrelated to the constitutional merits of the claim, leaving a petitioner without remedy.
The Court of Appeals' decision in Bilagody, however, suggests that a Superior Court would be abusing its discretion — and hence subject to reversal — if it were the only available venue for, and yet refused to hear, a claim that a license denial violated the First Amendment.
In Bilagody, the Arizona Court of Appeals considered a Superior Court judge's decision to decline jurisdiction over a special action in which the plaintiff challenged, on due process grounds, the state's suspension of his driver's license.
The court affirmed the dismissal "on the basis that the appellant had available an adequate remedy by appeal," Ariz. Were we to conclude, however, that the due process issue could not subsequently be raised, it would be necessary to reconsider the scope of the trial court's discretion to refuse to decide the issue in a special action.
As Justice Holmes once observed in another context: " I t is plain that a State cannot escape its constitutional obligations by the simple device of denying jurisdiction in such cases to Courts otherwise competent.
Supreme Lodge of the World, Order of Moose, U. The court's language here strongly suggests that it is not within the Superior Court's discretion to refuse to consider the merits of that claim unless some other avenue is open for the petitioner's challenge.
Arguing otherwise, Dream Palace points us to language in State ex rel. Dean v. City Court of City of Tucson, Ariz.
We have no reason to think, however, that the Arizona courts would find any "reason" to be "valid" that would deny a license applicant the review on the merits that the Constitution requires.
Dean itself did not deal with a constitutional claim; it merely upheld a Superior Court's decision not to review the City of Tucson's challenge to a municipal court's erroneous acquittal of a woman charged with a traffic violation, because double jeopardy principles would bar any further proceedings against her even if the City's claim were successful.
At most, then, Dean held that denial of review in a special action proceeding is appropriate where a holding for the plaintiff would have no real effect.
Thus, our reading of Arizona law inclines us to the view that the Superior Court does not have the kind of "discretion" over special action review that would render the process constitutionally insufficient.
In any event, we need not delve deeper into the vagaries of Arizona civil procedure law, because the special action is not the only procedure available to contest a license denial.
Ordinance P authorizes appeal from a denial not only by special action, but also by any "other available procedure. It would also include a suit under Arizona's declaratory judgment statute, A.
Dream Palace argues that this language authorizes a declaratory action only to determine the constitutionality or meaning of an ordinance, not to contest the denial of a license application.
But the statute permits a plaintiff to "obtain a declaration of rights" under an ordinance, and Ordinance P gives a qualified applicant the right to a license.
We see no reason why a declaratory action would not lie under these circumstances. Because these procedural routes — a suit for an injunction and a declaratory action — are open to an applicant whose license is denied, we need not conclusively resolve the parties' debate over the sufficiency of the special action proceeding.
Dream Palace also argues that review in an Arizona special action is inadequate because it is under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.
We disagree with that characterization of Arizona law. A court in a special action considers not only whether the defendant has abused his discretion, but also "[w]hether the defendant has failed Rules of Procedure for Special Actions 3 a.
Ordinance P imposes a duty on the county planning director to issue a license unless certain disqualifying conditions obtain; it gives the director no discretion to deny a qualified application.
A reviewing court will thus have no reason to defer to the director's decision. Dream Palace, however, argues that a special action court will defer to the county's determination of whether the facts establish a disqualifying condition.
Again, we do not think this contention accurately reflects Arizona law. It is true that the Arizona Court of Appeals has held, in a case not involving the First Amendment, that a court hearing a special action challenge to an administrative decision "may not weigh the evidence on which the decision was based.
Dep't of Public Safety v. Dowd, Ariz. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. We have no reason to think that Arizona courts will not assiduously carry out their duty to ensure that meaningful judicial review is not evaded through biased factfinding.
Finally, as discussed above, a special action is not the only judicial procedure available to a denied license applicant, who may also obtain review through a suit for an injunction or declaratory relief.
Neither of those procedures calls for any heightened deference on the part of the state court. In light of City of Littleton, and having rejected both of Dream Palace's new arguments for its unconstitutionality, we are satisfied that Ordinance P provides the opportunity for both access to judicial review and a prompt judicial decision, as the First Amendment requires.
Of course, if some undiscovered quirk of state procedure were to prevent an applicant from receiving meaningful judicial review, a challenge to the ordinance as applied would lie in federal court.
See City of Littleton, S. Dream Palace also contests the adequacy of the procedural safeguards in the ordinance to sustain the validity of the prior restraints involved in the manager and dancer work permit requirements.
Application for said permits "shall be made in the same manner as application for an adult business license The upshot is that all of the procedural safeguards with respect to the issuance of business licenses — the requirement of a speedy decision, and the provisions for administrative appeals and judicial review — apply equally to applications for work permits.
Permit applicants are provided with an additional safeguard: upon receipt of a properly filed application, the county is required to issue a temporary permit to the applicant, see id.
See id. For the reasons we previously stated, we reject this argument. See supra section III. Second, Dream Palace argues that requiring managers and dancers to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial review constitutes a prior restraint.
We reiterate that the critical issues with respect to the applicant's First Amendment rights are "a specified and reasonable period during which the status quo is maintained," and the "possibility of prompt judicial review.
Requiring administrative exhaustion implicates neither of these two constitutional prerequisites. The ordinance guarantees a "specified and reasonable time" within which an administrative decision must be made, and the applicant, temporary permit in hand, may continue to work pending the outcome of administrative and judicial review.
In Convoy, we held that " [o]nce administrative remedies have been exhausted, a party whose license has been suspended or revoked may seek judicial review.
We make explicit now what was implicit in our decision in Convoy: requiring applicants to exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial review does not violate the First Amendment, so long as an administrative decision is rendered within a specified, reasonable time, "during which time the status quo is maintained.
Finally, Dream Palace's argument that placing the burden of seeking judicial review on managers and dancers constitutes a prior restraint is foreclosed by our decision in Baby Tam III.
See infra n. In Baby Tam III, we held that "placing the burden of instituting proceedings on the state does not apply to licensing schemes such as the one challenged here.
Dream Palace's next challenge is to the disclosure requirements with respect to manager and employee work permit applications.
Section 6 of the ordinance specifies the process applicants must follow in applying for a work permit, pursuant to which permit applicants are required to submit information regarding their full true names, including "aliases or stage names" previously used, as well their current residential address and telephone numbers.
Section 9 in turn provides that any information a permit applicant submits to the county "shall be maintained in confidence Second, and in the alternative, it asks for injunctive relief against disclosure of said information to the public.
We take each step in turn. Kitsap County, F. In Kev, we considered a challenge to a city ordinance requiring nude dancers applying for a work permit to provide to the city their name, phone number, birth date, and aliases, past and present.
We found that requiring disclosure of such information would not "discourage None of the information required by the County unreasonably diminishes the inclination to seek a license.
Because the required disclosure did not "inhibit[ ] the ability or the inclination to engage in the protected expression," it was a valid licensing requirement.
The required disclosures under the ordinance at issue in this case, and the city ordinance at issue in Kev, are indistinguishable, and Kev therefore controls.
Dream Palace urges in the alternative that, even if we find the required disclosures to the County valid, we should grant injunctive relief to prevent the county from disclosing that information to the public.
The requirements for the issuance of a permanent injunction are 1 the likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury; and 2 the inadequacy of remedies at law.
Investments, Inc. Wilson, F. The district court's refusal to grant a permanent injunction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
The potential First Amendment problem here arises from the interplay between county and state law. While Section 9 of the ordinance provides that "information provided by an applicant in connection with the applicant for a license or permit under this ordinance shall be maintained in confidence by the Director," that confidentiality protection is "subject The county does not dispute that applicant information provided to the county is a "public record" within the meaning of this provision, and that those records are "presumed open to the public for inspection as public records.
Pima County, Ariz. The public right of inspection may be overcome in the interest of "confidentiality, privacy, or the best interests of the state.
The State, however, "has the burden of overcoming the legal presumption favoring disclosure. KPNX Broadcasting Co. Collins, Ariz. The potentially dangerous consequences that the interplay of these rules poses to permit applicants is obvious.
Should an erotic dancer, say, wish to apply for a work permit, as required by the ordinance, he or she must provide information regarding true name, including aliases or other names used in the past five years, as well as current home address and telephone number.
Under Arizona law, that information is presumptively available to anybody who pleases to ask for it, and the county, though it may refuse to provide such information to the public, has the burden in subsequent proceedings of overcoming the statutory presumption in favor of disclosure.
The "confidentiality" provision included in the ordinance is essentially a nullity, because that provision is made "subject The exception therefore swallows the rule.
The Sixth Circuit confronted a similar problem in Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. The Metropolitan Gov. The Nashville ordinance at issue in that case required permit applicants to divulge certain personal information about themselves, including their current and former residential addresses.
That information was presumptively available to the public pursuant to the Tennessee Open Records Act. The court found there was "significant evidence that the requirement that applicants submit their names and past and current addresses to a public forum poses serious risks to their personal security.
The court concluded that "permit applicants' names and current and past residential addresses constitute[s] protected private information" and therefore it was "exempted from Tennessee's Open Records Act.
Enterprises, Inc. City of Houston, F. The court held that state law already rendered the information confidential and unavailable to the public; thus, it reasoned, requiring applicants to supply the information did not infringe their First Amendment rights.
The Fifth Circuit panel therefore reversed the Texas district court's injunction. It did not disagree that where there is no guarantee of confidentiality, "concerns about public disclosure City of Houston, 27 F.
As the district court in N. Enterprises reasoned:. Adult entertainers may anonymously or through stage names put their bodies on display in front of strangers, but these actions do not imply a willingness to publicize the entertainers' personal information through which customers or other private persons may trace the entertainers to their homes or otherwise invade their privacy without permission.
The fact that an entertainer is willing to dance publicly or a manager is willing to be employed in a sexually oriented business that deals with the public, or the fact that a determined harasser or stalker might conceivably follow an entertainer home after she leaves work, does not mean that adult entertainers and managers have voluntarily sacrificed all privacy rights and need for safety protections.
In Clark, we ourselves recognized the potential danger from public disclosure of information provided to the government in the course of applying for a work permit posed for nude dancers, albeit in the course of deciding whether or not an owner-operator of a nude dancing club had overbreadth standing to raise the rights of his managers and employees.
See Clark, F. We recognized in that case the possibility "that cabaret patrons could obtain such personal information and harass the entertainers at their homes, or worse.
Because of the potential danger, we concluded that "there is a risk cabaret employees will engage in self-censorship and avoid participating in protected activity We agree with this analysis.
The First Amendment does not permit the county to put employees of adult entertainment establishments to the choice of either applying for a permit to engage in protected expression in circumstances where they expose themselves to "unwelcome harassment from aggressive suitors and overzealous opponents" of such activity, N.
The chilling effect on those wishing to engage in First Amendment activity is obvious. This was the most misleading and money stealing Gentlemens club i have ever been to.
The ATM fee alone was They will say ANYTHING to get your money, and then do VERY little more than dance INFRONT of you in the clubs??
The girls say everything possible, and highly pressure you into?? The absolute worst part, was after they made it clear the??
And Again, no matter what they say, they don?? Does not even deserve one star. This was the most misleading and money stealing??
Gentlemens club?? Timothy P. May 14, 1 Dream Palace. I went to Dream Palace for the first time the other night and had a great time.
The hostesses and girls are a little aggressive with their sales pitch and the private dances are pretty expensive but I'm glad I tried one.
The girls are super hot and friendly. I sat and watched the stage for awhile and "tried out" a few different girls with a regular lapdance before going back.
I was allowed to touch the stripper in the backroom which is ALOT different where I'm from. Neil G. February 11, 5 Dream Palace. I went to Dream Palace the other night with a few friends and it seemed pretty cool.
The girls are really friendly and sit and chat for awhile before hitting you up for a dance. The strippers will even hang out with you outside for a smoke-very cool.
They have private dances here-I haven't tried one of those-just stuck to watching the stage and getting lapdances, but maybe I'll try one one of these days.
I'll definitely visit again. Hugh J. February 08, 4 Dream Palace. I go to Dream Palace about once a month when I'm in town and I ALWAYS have a good time.
I get private dances when I go and they are well worth the money. You get what you pay for and in this case its your own private room with any dancer, fully nude dances on your lap, touching allowed.
Is it the highest class looking place? No, but I'm from Vegas but I am always treated like a VIP here and highly recommend the club.
Mike O. February 02, 4 Dream Palace. My husband and I decided to go here for our anniversary and it was sooo hot!!! We started out just watching the stage and the girls were super nice to me!
I loved all the attention I got from them when I sat in the front of the stage! My husband bought me a few regular lapdances but I wanted more so I chose the girl I wanted and all three of us went into a private room for an hour.
I thought it was cool that instead of being charged double for 2 people females are half price. The dance was very sexy and my husband and I were allowed to touch the dancer and each other.
It was fun for me to watch the dancer dance on my husband and he enjoyed watching some girl on girl action too.
It was a great way to get a "threesome" experience without actually having a threesome, and it really turned me on for when my husband and I went home.
Allie B. January 28, 5 Dream Palace. I go to DP all the time and usually buy a private show. Yes it can be expensive but if you take your time and choose the right girl she will treat you right and negotiate with you.
You have to remember it is a strip club and you get what you pay for. I like that I get my own private room and I'm allowed to touch the dancer and don't have to sit on my hands.
We paid for the birthday party package for my friend's birthday and it was awesome!!!